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This  study provides evidence  on the relationship between audit report type 
and subsequent business termination in an environment where firms  are closely 
held  and  the  audit  environment  is  non-litigious.  The  results  show  that  an 
endogenous  relationship  exists  between  bankruptcy  and  audit  report  type,  and 
between voluntary liquidation and audit report type. A non-clean opinion is typically 
given to firms with fmancial difficulties, which in tum become more severe after the 
receipt of a non-clean audit opinion. We find evidence that, even without a litigation 
deterrent in Belgium,  financial  performance has a  similar impact on audit report 
type as in litigious environments, that is, the worse the financial condition the higher 
the  likelihood  of receiving  a  non-clean audit  report.  We  also  find  that  the  self-
fulfilling prophecy holds for bankruptcy, that is that a non-clean audit report triggers 
bankruptcy. 
Our  paper  investigated  the  relationship  between  audit  report  type  and 
business  termination  for  various  types  of  business  terminations  including 
bankruptcy,  voluntary  liquidation  and  merger.  The  results  reveal  Significant 
differences across the forementioned types of business terminations. One difference 
is that the self-fulfilling prophecy only holds when the audited firm has no decision 
power as to termination of is operations, that is for bankruptcy. It does not hold for 
voluntary liquidation nor merger. 
Another important difference relates to business termination through merger. 
No  significant difference in performance exists between surviving and merging firms 
and no endogenous relationship exists between mergers and audit report type.  For 
merging  firms  audit  report  qualifications  are  triggered  by the  weakness  of the 
auditee's internal control system and not by substandard financial performance. 
Finally, our study provides some evidence on quality differentiation between 
Big  Six  and  non  Big  Six  auditors  in  the  Belgian  audit  market.  When  financial 
difficulties are obvious, as is the case when a company is about to go bankrupt, both 
Big Six and non big Six auditors are as competent and/or independent to assess and 
report  going  concern  problems.  However,  when  finanCial  difficulties  are  less 
apparent, as is the case for firms which are about to go into liquidation, our results 
indicate that Big Six auditors are more likely to issue a qualified audit opinion. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Previous research has examined the relationship between audit report type 
and firms' financial distress. Two distinct tracks were followed. One group of studies 
[ see, for example, Mutchler 1985, Dopuch et al.  1987, Menon and Schwartz 1987, 
Bell and Tabor 1991, Chen and Church 1992, Mutchler et al.  1996] focused on 
investigating financial and other determinants of audit report type choice, where 
most examine determinants of going concern qualifications. Another group of studies 
[ see, for example, Hopwood et al.  1989, Citron and Taffler 1992] examined the 
impact of audit report type on the probability of future bankruptcy and/or firm 
survival (self-fulfilling prophecy), 
This paper wants to contribute to the literature in three ways. 
First,  unlike previous work,  the relationship between audit report type and 
business  termination  is  studied  as  an  endogenous  relationship.  In  all  previous 
studies on audit reporting, it is assumed that  financial performance determines the 
likelihood of issuing a  qualified audit opinion, but the impact of the type of audit 
opinion  itself  on  an  auditee's  financial  performance  is  ignored.  Financial 
performance measures are thus considered as exogenous variables, while they might 
not be. When an auditor has to deCide upon audit report type, the financial condition 
of  the  client  is  taken  into  consideration.  However,  the  likelihood  of  business 
termination can be accelerated by the receipt of a non-clean opinion. 
Second, given the endogenous relationship between the audit report type and 
financial  performance,  the  determinants  of audit  report  type  are  studied  in  an 
environment where firms are privately held, auditing is mandatory and virtually no 
litigation against auditors exists. When auditors are not sued for issuing the wrong 
type  of  audit  report,  not  so  much  the  adverse  consequences  of  issuing  an 
inappropriate  audit  report,  but  rather  auditor  reputation  has  to  safeguard  an 
acceptable audit quality level. This raises the interesting research question whether 3 
financial performance influences audit report type to the same extent as in litigious 
environments like the US. 
Finally, given the characteristics of the Belgian audit and legal environment, 
where most firms are privately held, we investigate whether various stakeholders 
(such as, for example, banks and suppliers) rely on the information provided in the 
audit report for decision making. We test whether the self-fulfIlling prophecy that a 
non-clean audit report affects subsequent business termination holds. Furthermore, 
we do not only test this hypothesis for subsequent failure, but also for two weaker 
forms of business termination, namely voluntary liquidation and merger. 
The results show that an endogenous relationship exists between business 
termination and audit report type. A non-clean opinion is typically given when firms 
are facing financial difficulties, which in tum become more severe by reception of a 
non-clean opinion. Given this endogenous relationship, the auditor's concern about 
reputation guarantees that the auditee's financial performance has a  similar impact 
on  the  auditor's  opinion  in  Belgium  (a  non-litigious  environment)  as  it  has  in 
litigious environments. 
However,  significant differences  occur for  the alternative  types  of business 
terminations studied in this paper (Le.  bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation and merger 
I  take over). First, the self-fulfilling prophecy only holds when firms do not have the 
decision  power  to  terminate  their  operations,  as  is  the  case  with  bankruptcies. 
Second, The results are also entirely different for merging firms as compared to the 
two other types of bUSiness terminations (bankruptcy and voluntary liquidation). No 
significant  difference  in  performance  between  surviving  and  merging  firms  is 
apparent from  the  data and  no  evidence  of an endogenous relationship between 
business termination decision and audit report type was detected. For merging firms 
weak  internal  control  systems  are  the  main  reason  for  reception  of an  audit 
qualification. Finally, even in a  non-litigious environment quality differences can be 4 
observed  between Big Six and non Big  Six auditors.  In circumstances where  the 
financial  difficulties  are  obvious,  i.e.  bankruptcy,  both auditor types  are  equally 
competent  to  assess  and  signal  going  concern  problems  of  clients.  when  this 
assessment is more difficult, such as for liquidating firms, Big Six auditors are more 
likely to issue a qualified opinion. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.  Section 2  discusses the 
research questions and provides information on the Belgian auditing environment. 
Section  3  clarifies  methodological  issues  and  section  4  specifies  the  model  and 
provides a discussion of our results. Finally, some conclusions are drawn in section 
5. 
2.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AUDIT REPORTING 
AND BUSINESS TERMINATION IN BELGIUM 
2.1. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BELGIAN CAPITAL MARKET AND AUDIT ENVIRONMENT 
Belgium is a  continental European country with an institutional, accounting 
and  auditing  environment  which  is  different  from  the  one  in  the  US.  Notable 
differences  relate  to  the  audit function  and  audit regulations  as well  as  to  the 
characteristics of the capital market. 
The Belgian capital market is much less developed compared to that in the 
US.  Stock market capitalisation was only 33% of GNP in 1995, as compared to 82% 
in the  US.  Very few  (only about 130)  companies are listed on the Brussels stock 
exchange as the majority of companies are family owned. Furthermore, ownership is 
concentrated (very few shareholders) even in listed companies. Hence, unlike the US, 
widespread  ownership  is  not  a  major  reason  for  demand  of  publicly  available 
financial statements. On the contrary, demand for financial statements stems mainly 
from  government.  Companies which  meet certain legal  form and  size  criteria are 5 
mandated to file  financial statements with the Belgian National Bank 2.  However. 
that does not mean that the other stakeholders of the firm do not use the financial 
statements for decision making. 
Besides the capital environment, the auditing environment is significantly 
different from the one in the US. Auditing is mandatory for all large companies in 
Belgium 3. The regulator's motivation for such a widespread mandatory audit 
requirement is protection of all stakeholders of a company (such as employees. 
suppliers. banks  ....  J.  Furthermore. unlike the American audit environment the 
Belgian one is not at all litigious. The issuance of a wrong opinion by the auditor (for 
example. no going concern exception when financial difficulties are obvious and the 
firm fails afterwards) almost never results in a court case against the auditor. A valid 
question is therefore whether Belgian auditors have a big enough incentive to supply 
high quality audits and in due course issue a qualified or adverse audit opinion. 
Usually the threat of litigation works as a deterrent against below standard audit 
quality. When such a threat is absent the auditor may feel tempted to keep a friendly 
relationship with a client in order to safeguard the appointment. 
To  provide  a  stimulus  for  independence.  the  Institute  of auditors  tries  to 
provide  several guarantees.  First,  auditors are to be appointed for  three years in 
Belgium  although  no  mandatory  rotation  is  required  after  three  years.  Second. 
Belgian  auditors are  also  subject to  disciplinary sanctions when they violate  the 
Ethical  code  (Royal  Decree  of  10 January  1994).  Third.  the  Belgian  Institute  of 
2 A firm is obliged to prepare and publish financial statements when limited liability of the owners is guaranteed. 
The amount of the financial information provided depends on the size of the firm. If  the firms meet two of the 
following criteria. total assets> 1  00 million francs. turnover >200 million Belgian francs and the number of 
employees is larger than 50 • then the full  scheme of the financial statements is demanded. Companies with more 
than  100 employees are always required to  use this scheme. An example of a difference in the information provided 
between the full  and the reduced scheme is the amount of sales. which is only required when the firm uses the full 
scheme. 
J Large companies are companies which meet at least two of the following criteria: Total assets> 100 million BEF; 
Turnover> 200 million BEF. number of employees> 50. Companies with more than 100 employees are always 
classified as a large company irrespective of their total assets or turnover. 6 
Auditors  organises  directed  investigations  in  audit  firms  to  safeguard  audit 
competence and independence. Fourth, every certified auditor is also subject to a 
peer review once in every five  years. Finally, although not imposed by the Institute, 
the auditor's concern about his or her reputation can be an incentive to maintain  a 
certain quality level. 
As to the possible types and the content of an audit opinion  the Belgian 
environment does not extensively differs from other countries. The different types of 
audit opinions include: an unqualified opinion, a qualified opinion, an adverse 
opinion and a disclaimer. Conditions under which a certain report type should be 
issued are comparable to most other countries, including the US.  Qualifications 
relate to going concern problems and GAAP violations (mostly valuation problems of 
receivables, inventory or financial assets). 
The content of the audit opinion is similar to that in other countries. An 
importance differnce, however, is that the auditor is required to provide an explicit 
assessment of the quality of an auditee's internal control system in the audit report. 
2.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The endogenous relationship between business tennination and audit report type 
This paper addresses the audit reporting decision making process in Belgium 
and its relationship with subsequent business termination of client companies. In 
previous research, the impact of financial health on audit report type choice by an 
auditor and the impact of audit report type  on subsequent business termination 
(mostly bankruptcy) have been examined as two independent relationships. 
The impact of financial condition on audit report type is widely documented 
(Mutchler, 1985; Dopuch et al.  1987, Bell and Tabor, 1991; Chen and Church, 1992). In all these studies it has been shown that the receipt of a non-clean opinion 
is determined by weak financial performance (signalled by liquidity, solvency and 
profitability problems). 
The evidence on the impact of audit report type on business termination is 
scarce and results are mixed (Citron & Taffier,  1992; Hopwood at aI., 1987). 
7 
the study of citron & taffler (1992), which uses a univariate analysis, did not 
find evidence for the self-fulfilling prophecy. on the contrary, The multivariate results 
of hopwood at al. (1989) show that a consistency as well as the going concern 
opinion are significant in explaining bankruptcy the year before failure. 
No study has tried to link the above two questions although audit report type 
and financial condition may influence one another. When the auditor makes an 
audit report decision, he assesses the financial condition of the auditee. One could 
say that the auditor assesses the likelihood that the auditee will terminate 
operations in the near future. On the other hand, it may well be that the audit report 
type an auditee receives affects deCisions of stakeholders to the firm and hence 
affects the likelihood of business termination the subsequent year. A non-clean audit 
report could accelerate firm failure, liquidation or even merger or take over (self-
fulfilling prophecy). Therefore financial condition and audit report type could be 
mutually dependent, and hence endogenous variables. This results in the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: There exists an endogenous relationship between audit report type and 
the likelihood of  business tennination 
Given  possible endogeneity, the determinants of audit report type as well as 
business termination will be investigated. 8 
The impact oj  likelihood oj  business termination on the audit reporting decision 
Prior American research has reported evidence on the impact of an auditee's 
financial condition on audit report type choice by an auditor [ see, for example, 
Mutchler 1985, Dopuch et al.  1987, Bell and Tabor 1991, Chen and Church 1992]. 
The studies can be divided into three categories depending on the type of the 
independent variables used: the level of performance (Mutchler, 1985; Chen and 
Church, 1992), the change in performance compared to the previous year (Dopuch et 
al.  1987; Bell & Tabor, 1991) and the deviation from the average performance in the 
industry (Bell & Tabor, 1991). the size ofreceivables and inventory (Dopuch et al. 
1987;Bell & Tabor, 1991) and the size of the audited fIrm (Dopuch et al.1991; Chen 
& Church, 1992) are also relevant in explaining audit report type. Finally, market 
data are also included in the studies of Dopuch et al. (1987) and Bell & Tabor (1991), 
which can not be used in the current study as all fIrms in the sample are privately 
held 4. 
Given  the  institutional differences between the  US  and Belgium,  where no 
litigation  against auditors exists  and fIrms  are privately held,  it is interesting to 
investigate whether a company's financial condition signifIcantly affects the issuance 
of a  non-clean  audit  report  in  Belgium.  Should  fInancial  performance  have  no 
signifIcant impact on audit reporting,  in the sense that below standard financial 
performance does not lead to audit qualifIcation,  one could infer that abscence of 
litigation and lack of concern about client loss lead to less stringent audit reporting 
in Belgium. In case the opposite result is found, that is that an auditee's fInancial 
performance does significantly affect audit reporting, we can conclude that a certain 
audit  reporting  quality  level  is  maintained  in  Belgium  despite  the  absence  of 
4  Only the studies, which use a mixed sample of bankrupt and surviving firms are mentioned allthough studies also 
exist which  which investigate the type of the audit report before bankruptcy (Menon & 9 
litigation.  This  can  be  attrtbuted  to  the  auditor's  concern about reputation  and 
possible disciplinary sanctions which can be imposed by the Institute of auditors if 
certain  quality  standards  are  not  met.  In  this  context,  we  test  the  following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: In an environment, where no litigation against auditors exists andfirms 
are closely  held,  the  audit report type  is  signifl.Cantly  affected by the  likelihood  of 
business tennination (failure, liquidation and merger). 
Unlike previous studies, we not only pose this question for a sample of surviving and 
bankrupt firms,  but also for two other types of business terminations: voluntary 
liquidation and merger. This enables us to investigate whether the likelihood of 
subsequent business termination  has the same influence on the receipt of a non-
clean opinion for various groups of business terminations, i.e. voluntary liquidation, 
failure and merger. We expect the influence of the likelihood of subsequent business 
termination on audit report type to differ across alternative forms of business 
termination (and their respective match of survivers). One reason for this is that it is 
likely that alternative forms of bUSiness terminations are related to different levels of 
financial performance.  The following hypothesis is tested in this context: 
Hypothesis 3: Thefinancial condition of  afinn has a different influence on the 
likelihood of  receiving a non-clean opinion for bankrupt, liquidating or merging firms. 
Schwartz, 1987; Mutchler et aI.,  1997). 10 
The impact of  audit report type on subsequent business termination 
As the relationship between financial perlonnance and audit report type is 
endogenously studied, another question we pose is whether audit report type affects 
business termination the subsequent year. 
By posing this question we test the self-fulfilling prophecy that business 
termination is triggered by a non-clean audit report. We believe that this is 
particularly interesting in an environment as the Belgian one where auditing is 
mandatory for non-listed companies with concentrated ownership. As the finn's 
investors are typically also involved in the management of the company and/or have 
a seat on the board of directors, the agency role of auditing is no longer obvious. 
Therefore one could question the economic value of mandatory auditing in Belgium. 
It is interesting to test of whether the audit report has at least some infonnational 
value for (other) stakeholders of the auditee (banks, suppliers and employees), as the 
regulators claim. In summary, our test is a test of the economic role of auditing in a 
regulated environment. 
Hypothesis 4: In a non- litigious environment andfor closely held  firms , the likelihood 
of  business termination ( bankruptcy, liquidation and/merger)  is significantly affected 
by the audit report type issued on the financial statements of  the previous year. 
Unlike previous studies (Hopwood et aI.,  1989, Citron and Taffler, 1992), the self-
fulfilling prophecy hypothesis is not only tested for a sample of failing and surviving 
finns but for all types of business termination (failure, voluntary liquidation and 
merger /  take over). The type of the audit report is expected to have a larger 
influence on the likelihood of business termination, when the owners have no 
decision power on the incidence of bUSiness termination. Usually, owners have II 
(some) power with respect to voluntary liquidation and merger,  but not with respect 
to failure as in the latter case banks and suppliers go to court to demand 
bankruptcy. This results in the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: The audit report type has a larger influence on the incidence of  failure 
than on voluntary vliquidation or merger. 
3. SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION MODEL 
In this section we introduce an audit report type and business termination 
simultaneous equation modeL Let ARt and BUSTt+l denote unobserved latent 
variables that represent the likelihood of the auditor to issue a non-clean opinion on 
the company's financial statements of period t (AR:),  and that of the auditee to 
terminate its operations in the subsequent period t +1  (BUSTt+l), respectively. When 
the auditor makes an audit report decision, he assesses the financial condition of the 
auditee. One could say that the auditor assesses the likelihood that the auditee will 
terminate operations during the subsequent period. If  indeed audit report type is 
motivated by the likelihood that the auditee continues to exist or not, ARt is a 
function of BUSTt+l. Hence: 
ARt  = ao + al BUSTt+l  + ITI X + III  (1) 
holds,  where X represents a vector of other observed exogenous variables ( besides 
BUSTt+l) which affect ARt, and III is the error term. 
If the likelihood that the auditee terminates its operations in period t+l is in turn 
affected by the previous year's audit report, and a simultaneous relation between 
audit report type and subsequent business termination indeed exists, then BUSTt+l 
depends on ARt as well and this can be written as: 12 
BUSTt+l  =  130  + 131  ARt  + f12 Y + J..l2  (2) 
where Y represents a vector of other observed exogenous vartables (besides ARt) 
which affect BUSTt+l. and J..l2  is the error term. 
If simultaneity indeed exists between AR and BUST. logit estimates of 
equations (1) and (2) would not yield unbiased consistent estimates of the 
coefficients because AR and BUST are correlated with the error terms (Gujarati. 
1995). Therefore a two-stage procedure is required. In the first stage only the 
independent exogenous vartables are introduced and the following reduced form 
equations are estimated: 
ARt  =  yo  + fl X + f2 Y + VI  (3) 
BUSTt+ 1  eo  + 01 X + 02 Y + V2  (4) 
where X and Y represent the vectors of observed exogenous vartables. and VI  and V2 
A  A 
represent the error terms. The result of these estimations is BUST t+l and AR t . 
A 
In the second stage. the predicted value of BUSTt+l.  BUST t+l.  is substituted in 
A 
equation (1). and the predicted value of ARt  AR t.  is substituted in equation (2). The 
following equations are then estimated: 
A 
ARt  = ao  +  0:.1  BUSTt+l  + ITI X +  J..ll  (5) 
A 
BUSTt+ 1  =  130  +  131  AR t  + f12 Y +  J..l2  (6) 13 
To test the simultaneity hypothesis we use the Hausman specification test (Gujarati. 
1995). This test also consists of two steps. First - as above - the reduced form 
/\  /\ 
equations (3) and (4)  are estimated. and BUST t+1  and  v 2 are estimated from (4), as 
/\  /\  /\ 
are  AR t and  v I from equation (3).  Second. ARt is regressed on BUST t+1  and v 2. and 
/\  /\ 
x (vector), and BUSTt+1 is regressed on  AR t and  v I. and Y (vector), respectively. This 
results in the estimation of the following logit regressions: 
/\ 
=  so + SI  BUSTt+1  + S2V2 + ZX + VI  (7) 
/\  /\ 
BUSTt+1  = Ao  + Al  AR t  + A2  V I  + A Y + V2  (8) 
/\ 
If  simultaneity indeed exists. the logit estimation of the parameters v 2  in 
equation (7) and  v I in equation (8) are significant. which indicates that a correlation 
exists between ARt and business termination BUST t+l.  Should ARt and BUSTt+lbe 
exogenous vartables. then no significance for the respective error terms will be 
found. 
4. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
In this section we define the explanatory variables for the audit report type model as 
well as the business termination model which are used in order to test the 
hypotheses introduced in section 2. 14 
The Audit Report Type Equation 
The audit report type equation (see also eq.  5) includes the hypothesised (and 
r-
to  be  tested)  endogenous  BUSTt+l  variable  and  a  vector  X  of  other  exogenous 
variables that may affect audit report type. 
A 
BUSTt+l (business termination) is included as a test variable in the AR-model 
to test hypothesis 2 that financial performance affects the opinion of the auditor 
despite the absence of litigation and a closely held ownership structure. From the 
results of previous research it is clear that a firm's financial health is a significant 
determinant of audit report type. Financial health can be assessed through various 
financial measures and a broad variety of such measures has been tested in prior 
studies ((Mutchler, 1985, Dopuch et aI.,  1987; Bell & Tabor, 1991 and Chen & 
Church, 1992). The advantage of our approach is that financial health is introduced 
by one aggregate measure, namely the probability of business termination, and not 
by various alternative exogenous variables, where correlation problems between the 
various financial variables could occur. 
The following control variables were included in the AR-modeI. The first 
control variable is BSlX, which is included to assess whether there is a difference in 
reporting behaviour between Big Six and Non Big Six audit firms in Belgium, for 
audits of non-listed firms in a non-litigious audit environment. In the US, Mutchler 
et al. (1996) found evidence that audit report type is influenced by the size of the 
audit firm.  LNASSET is the second variable included to control for size (see also 
Dopuch et al.  1987; Chen and Church, 1992). Client size could affect the audit 
opinion process, as it is reasonable to expect that auditor reputation will be affected 
more when a wrong opinion is issued for large clients which usually have greater 15 
visibility. However, the loss of a large client results in a larger decrease of the audit 
fees, which works as a disincentive of auditor independence. IC is the third variable 
included to control for the impact of the quality of the auditee's internal control 
environment as assessed by the auditor on the audit reporting decision.  It is 
expected that a weak internal control system increases the chance of a non-clean 
opinion as the chance of matertal errors is much larger. INVTA (inventory) and 
RECTA (receivables) are introduced as they capture high rtsk situations. In previous 
studies the evidence of the significance of these two variables is mixed (Dopuch et al. 
1987; Bell and Tabor, 1991). Finally, two more control variables, not included in 
previous studies, are included to cope with the specific features of the belgian 
environment: STBF and ALARM. The variable STBF measures the ex post need for 
short term bank financing. Apart from employees and suppliers, banks are major 
users of the financial statements in Belgium. Compared to the other users of the 
financial statements, they have better skills to value the information prOvided. The 
auditor is also aware of the extensive use of financial statements by banks and it is 
expected that the threshold for issuing a non-clean opinion will be lower.  Finally, 
ALARM,  measures how close the auditee is to an "alarm" situation which is defined 
in the Belgian law as a situation where a firm's net worth is smaller than half the 
size of the firm's capital. If an alarm situation occurs, the auditor is required to add a 
paragraph to the audit report, where he expresses his opinion about the going 
concern of the audited firm5. As the auditor has to pay special attention to this 
possible going concern problem, it is reasonable to expect that an alarm situation 
influences the chOice between a clean and a non-clean audit opinion 6. 
5 An  'alarm situation' occurs when a finn has serious financial problems due to cumulative losses. In this 
case, the Belgian company law prescribes various legal reqUirements, also the finn's general assembly is 
required to deCide on the going concern of the finn and to make and submit a recovery plan.  These 
requirements are imposed to protect stakeholders; it is clear that it is a clear Signal that a company may 
have a serious going concern problem. 
6 Note that unlike prior American research (Bell and Tabor, 1991; Dopuch et al. 1987). no market 16 
Using the independent vartables descrtbed above, the estimated logistic 
regression for ARt is as follows: 
" 
ARt =  /30  + /31  BUSTt+1  + /32  BSIX + /33  LNASSET + /34  IC  + /35  INVTA + /36  RECTA + 
/37  STBF + /38 ALARM 
Figure 1 : Overview of the vartables in the AR model 
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hypothesised (and to be tested) endogenous  AR t vartable and a vector Y of other 
exogenous vartables to control for other factors that affect business termination or 
survival. 
variables were included in the study as we are analysing audit reporting in privately held companies. 17 
The  AR  t variable represents the likelihood of a non-clean audit opinion and is 
a test variable for the self-fulfilling prophecy. Prior evidence on this topic is scarce 
and mixed. Hopwood et ai. (1989) show that a going concern as well as a consistency 
qualification help to predict future bankruptcy. Citron and Taffler (1992) report no 
significant results for the self -fulfilling prophecy. 
Since business termination or survival primarily depends on a company's 
financial performance, a number offinancial variables that have proven to be good 
discriminators between surviving and non-surviving firms in past research, were 
chosen as control variables.  As in many other studies (for a review see for example 
Dimitras et aI., 1996). proxies to measure liquidity, solvency and profitability 
problems are introduced. 
As a  firm  is more profitable,  measured by ROE,  the likelihood  of business 
termination is expected to be smaller. Even if a  firm faces losses, the existence of 
operating profits (measured by OPROFIT) results in a larger chance of survival. 
EQFIN and STDEBT are introduced to measure solvency problems. If a firm 
realised profits in the past and did not distribute them as dividends, the amount of 
equity as well as the likelihood of survival increase. However, the composition of 
debt is also relevant to predict failure. The larger the amount of short term debt, the 
larger the amount of debt which expires in the current year and the larger the 
chance of repayment problems. 
Finally, three liquidity measures EXPDEBT, NETCASH and LIQ are 
introduced. The variable NETCASH measures the difference between the cash 
available in the firm and the short term bank loans. If a firm has financial 
difficulties, the amount of net worth shrinks and more short term bank loans are 
needed to finance its operations, which increases the likelihood of business 
termination. 18 
The existence of expired debt to privileged parties such as tax and social 
security authorities has proven to be an extremely relevant measure to estimate 
liquidity problems in Belgium (see also Ooghe and Verbaere 1982. Ooghe et al. 
1994). As privileged parties have to be paid in any case if a company fails. firms only 
withhold from paying them when they do not have the necessary funds. Finally. LIQ 
measures the immediate liquidity in a fIrm. As it takes some time to turn inventories 
and receivables into cash. the chance of failure increases as they are a larger part of 
the current assets. 
Given these independent variables. the BUST -equation can be written as: 
A 
BUST  =  ~o + ~l  AR t  + ~2 ROE + ~3 OPROFIT + ~4 EQFIN + ~5 STDEBT + 
~6 EXPDEBT + ~7 NETCASH + ~8 LIQ + III 
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5. SAMPLE DESCRIPTION AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
5.1. SAMPLE SELECTION 
From the CDrom7 of the Belgian National Bank we selected all Belgian 
companies which were mandated to disclose and file annual financial statements 
with the Belgian National Bank and which report the financial information using the 
full schemes and which had terminated their business operations due to bankruptcy, 
liquidation 9 or merger with /  take over by another company in 1995 or 1996. We 
found that 230 such Belgian companies had terminated their business in 1995 or 
1996. We then selected a matched sample of 230 companies which had continued to 
exist in their current form in 1995 or 1996. The latter was matched with the sample 
of business terminations according to size, industry and year. 
Due to data limitations, a match between surviving firms and firms that had 
terminated their activities, was preferred above a match of firms that received a clean 
opinion and those that received a qualified audit opinion. The financial status firms 
(surviving, liquidation, failure or merger) but not the audit opinion is available on 
tape. As the audit report has to be bought on paper from the National Bank, it is 
impossible to match on the basis of audit report type10. 
For the total sample of 460 companies we then retrieved the financial 
statements of the year prior to business termination or firm survival and we 
7 The CDROM of the National Bank contains the financial statements of all firms with limited liability in Belgium, 
which are all obliged to make their financial statements publicly available. However, the CDROM only contains the 
balance sheet, the profit and loss account and the notes to the financial statements. Neither the audit report nor the 
notes from the board of directors is available on tape. These have to be bought on paper from the National Bank. 
S The sample is limited to firms which report their financial statements using the full scheme as only this category 
has to appoint an auditor. 
.9 The voluntary liquidating firms are only added to the sample in the first year they go into liquidation. All firms, 
which demanded liquidation in the past. but where the liquidation is not closed yet, are not introduced in the 
sample. 
iO The sample of Hopwood at al. (1989) is designed in a similar way, they also used a matched sample of bankrupt 
and surviving firms. No match  is done on financial performance as the non-clean opinions do not only contain 
going concern opinions but also qualifications for gaap. Furthermore, it is the purpose of the study to test the 20 
purchased the related audit report directly from the National Bank. We then 
identified for each company the audit report type it had received the year prior to 
business termination or firm survival. We finally deleted from the observations those 
companies which had received a disclaimer of opinion together with their match. 
Disclaimers of opinions are often given for reasons, which are not related to the 
financial performance, such as change of auditor. This resulted in a final sample of 
220 business terminations and 220 survivors. 
[Insert Table to be inserted about here] 
Table 1 Panel A presents a breakdown of our total sample by audit report type 
and business survival status categories. While 88.64% of survivors received an 
unqualified opinion, 63.64% of business terminations also received an unqualified 
opinion. Note however that this percentage is very different according to the type of 
business termination. Only 21.15% offailed firms received an unqualified opinion 
the year before they failed, where this percentage is 66.13% for the group of firms 
which voluntarily went into liquidation and 83.02% for fmns which merged of  were 
taken over. Note further also that a much higher percentage of firms which had 
terminated their business (76.19%) received a qualified or adverse opinion than 
those which survived (23.81  %). Also, the X2  statistic rejects the hypothesis of 
independence of audit report type and business survival status with a p-value of less 
than 1%. 
Some financial characteristics of the sample are given in Table 1 Panel B. 
Merging firms resemble surviving firms better than liquidating and failing firms. 
Failing firms perform significantly worse than the three other groups with respect to 
all financial performance measures. The occurrence of positive operating profits is in 
decreasing order of likelihood: 0.7091 for surviving firms, 0.6792 for merging fmns, 
inlluence of financial performance on the type of the audit opinion. 21 
0.3871 for liquidating firms, and 0.2500 for failing firms. Failing firms also have the 
worst solvency position, they are more likely to have expired debt towards privileged 
debt holders (tax authorities) (expdebt) and need more external bank financing to 
finance their daily activities (STBF). The data show that short term bank financing is 
even more likely to occur for the group of surviving firms (0.3045) than for the group 
of merging firms (0.2358), which illustrates that these two classes are very much 
alike. This is also confirmed by the liqUidity measure, for which merging firms have 
the largest amount of cash to the current assets ratio.  Finally, the expected ranking 
as to financial performance for the various categories of business terminations also 
exists with respect to the variable ALARM  (net worth/half of capital). Due to losses, 
the size of net worth is smallest for the group of failing firms (1.2316) followed by 
liqUidators (2.4063), than mergers (8.3171) and finally surviving firms (15.59). 
5.2  DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Simultaneity Test Results 
The first purpose of the paper is to investigate whether an endogenous relationship 
exists between audit report type and business termination. 
As already mentioned in the hypothesis section, it is not only the purpose to 
investigate this relationship for the for the total sample of all business terminations 
and their match of surviving firms (N  = 440) but also for the various subsamples 
(liquidation, merger or failure). 
We applied the Hausman specification test, and first estimated per (sub)sample the 
A  A 
reduced form equations (3) and (4)  to attain logit estimates for  BUSTt+l and AR t.  We 
then estimated values for the resp. error terms vland V2. Second, we estimated 22 
equations (7) and (8). Table 2 presents the results of the simultaneity tests for all 
(sub)samples. 
[Insert table 2 about here] 
A 
Inspection  of table  2  shows  that we  found  significant  coefficients  for  both  v  1 
A 
(Vl=O.0003)  and  vz  (vz=O.OOOl)  for  the  total  sample  (N).  This  shows  that  an 
endogenous relationship exists between audit report type and business termination, 
which  is  supportive  of hypothesis  1.  Business termination is  accelerated by the 
receipt of a non-clean opinion, which is determined by the financial performance of 
the firm itself. 
Inspection of the results of the Hausman test for the various subsamples yields some 
interesting insights. For both the subsample of bankrupt firms and their match (NI) 
and the subsample of liquidated firms and their match (Nz)  a  statistical significant 
A 
correlation between BUSTt+! and the error term v 1  (p=O.0008 for N!  and p=O.0225 for 
A 
N2)  and ARt  and the error term  v  2  (p=O.0013 for Nl  and p=O.0270 for Nz)  is found, 
which is supportive of our hypothesis  1 of simultaneity between audit report type 
and business survival status. Only for the subsample of firms which merged or were 
taken over and their match (N3)  no supportive evidence of simultaneity was found. 
A  A 
Neither  Y  1  (p=O.6107)  nor  Y z (p=O.4097)  are significant. A plausible reason for the 
lack of endogeneity could be that a merger is often done for other reasons than weak 
financial  performance, and that these other reasons do  not result ill a  non-clean 
opinion from the auditor. 23 
In the remainder of this study we will analyse the AR and BUST models exogenously 
for  the subsample of  merging firms,  while for the total sample as well as for the 
sub  samples of liquiditating and bankrupt firms,  the relationship between AR  and 
BUST will be studied as an endogenous relationship. 
Results oj  the AR model 
Table 3 presents the results of the logistic regression on audit report type. 
[Insert Table 3 about here]ll 
Panel A presents the estimates for the total sample of all companies in the 
study whereas panels B,  C and D present the estimates for the respective 
subsamples of liquidating, bankrupt and merging firms. For the total sample and 
subsamples of liquidators and bankrupt firms where a simultaneous model is tested, 
the BUST variable is endogenised and represents the likelihood of respectively 
business termination, bankruptcy or liquidation, as assessed using the model in 
table 2.  For the subsample of mergers where the audit report type model is an 
'exogenous' model, the BUST variable represents the actual merger /  take over status 
of the company in the subsequent year. 
1\ 
The business termination variable BUST 1+1 has a coefficient significantly 
different from zero (p=O.OOOl) for the total sample. This evidence is supportive of 
hypothesis 2 that the likelihood of business termination determines the chance of 
11 The coefficients are not biased by problems of too high correlation. The highest correlation for the total sample 
1\ 
occurs between Oprofits and  AR  t. which equals -0.51011. The highest correlation for subsample 1, the group of 
1\ 
bankruptcy firms occurs  between Oprofits and  AR t. reaches -0.56054. The highest correlation exists between 
BigSix and lnassets (-0.30177) for the group of liquidating firms. Finally, the largest correlation exists between 
lnasset and Bigsix for subs ample 3, the group of merging firms (-0.30002). 24 
receiving a non-clean opinion. Despite the absence of litigation,  financial problems 
do trigger the issuance of a non-clean opinion in Belgium. 
f\ 
As to the significance of BUSTt+l for the various subsamples, the results show 
that it  influences audit report type for the subsample of liquidating (N2,  p=O.0015) 
and bankrupt firms (N l ,  p=O.0003) but not for the subsample of merging firms (N3, 
p=O.2902). This means that a subsequent merger or take over does not affect the 
auditor's opinion on the financial statements of the year prior to the merger /  take 
over. A viable explanation for this result is that firms that merge or are taken over 
are performing much like surviving firms. Planned mergers are often done for other 
reasons than weak financial performance of the targeP2. This confmns hypothesis 3 
that finanCial condition does not have the same influence on the issuance of a non-
clean opinion across the various subsamples.  In summary, the significance of 
f\ 
BUSTt+l shows that audit report type is influenced by factors similar to those which 
are significant in American studies, even though the environment is substantially 
different (non-litigious and closely held firms). 
The significance of the control variables also differs across the alternative 
subsamples. The IC-variable is strongly significant (p-value < 1 %) for the subs  ample 
of merging firms (p=O.0006) but not for the total sample and the subsample of 
bankrupt and liquidated firms. Note that this variable only significantly affects the 
"  audit reporting decision in the subsample where the BUSTt+l does not significantly 
affect that decision. This implies that for companies which are not such bad financial 
performers, a badly organised Internal Control system rather than financial variables 
triggers the issuance of a non-clean audit report. 
12 Also. out of this subsample of 212 finns only 32 finns received a non-clean audit report, whereas for 
the group of bankrupt and liqUidated finns together (i.e. Nl + N2) 73 finns out of228 finns received a 
non-clean audit report. 25 
The evidence with respect to the impact of auditor type on audit report type is 
mixed. The variable BIGSIX has a significant positive coefficient for the subsample of 
liquidated firms (p=0.0297) but not for the other two subsamples, which shows that 
some quality differentiation occurs in the audit market. When firms are performing 
very badly, and subsequently go bankrupt, both Big Six and Non Big Six auditors are 
able to read such signals (competence) and will issue a non-clean audit report to 
protect themselves from future reputational damage (independence). As the 
univariate results show, the problems of liquidating firms are less severe than those 
of bankrupt firms. The statistical significance of auditor type in the subsample of 
liquidating firms may indicate that Big Six auditors are more likely to detect the less 
apparent problems (competence) or that they are more likely to report these potential 
problems when detected (independence). The insignificance of BSIX for the 
subs  ample of merging firms can be explained by the fact that merging firms exhibit 
financial performance Similar to surviving firms. 
The other two variables, which capture the specific Belgian situation, give 
different results than expected. The insignificance of the variable STBF for the total 
sample as well as for the alternative subsamples shows that the auditor is not 
influenced by the type of reader of the financial statements.  Furthermore, The 
variable alarm is  only significant for the subsamples of liquidators (p= 0.0059) and 
mergers (p=0.074) but not for the total sample and the subsample of failing firms. 
This could mean that financial problems are that obvious (high significance of 
BUSTt+il when firms are in an alarm situation such that an additional report on the 
going concern situation of the firm does not influence the opinion of the auditor, 
while it does when financial problems are not that obvious13• 
]) When the results of the exogenous regressions are compared to the endogenised results, it is 
interesting to mention that the overall significance of the model increases in an endogenised 26 
Unlike previous studies (Dopuch et al. , 1987; Chen & Church, 1992), the size of the 
auditee does not significantly influence the audit opinion for the total sample or the 
different subsamples. Finally, mixed results are found for the two variables INVI'A 
and RECTA, which test the chance of material errors in the financial statements. The 
INVI'A variable has a positive significant coefficient for the total sample (p= 0.0416) 
and the subsample of merging firms (p=O.0147), which confirms previous evidence 
(see, for example, Dopuch et al.  1987; Bell and Tabor, 1991). A somehow 
counterintuitive result is the negative significant coefficient for INVTA in subsample 
of bankrupt firms (p=O.0354). A possible explanation could be that bankrupt firms, 
which are more likely to receive a non-clean report, reduce their inventories to cope 
with their liquidity problems. Finally, The importance of the receivables in the 
balance sheet does not influence the opinion of the auditor, neither for the total 
sample nor for the alternative subsamples. 
Results of  the BUSTrrwdel 
The BUST-model was tested to provide empirical evidence on the self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Table 4 Panel A gives the estimates for the total sample of all companies in 
the study (N), whereas panels B, C, and D exhibit the estimates for the respective 
subsamples of bankrupt firms (Nil, liquidators (N2)  and mergers (N3).  Note again that 
for the total sample and the subsample of bankrupt firms and liqUidators  a 
simultaneous equation model is tested where the AR variable is endogenised and 
represents the likelihood of a non-clean audit report. The likelihood of a non-clean 
relationship. Some differences occur for the significance of the independent variables. The 
variables DALARM,STBF, lC are significant in the regression analysis for the total sample, 
which ignores the endogenised relationship. For the subsample of bankrupt firms the only 
difference is the significance of lC and for the subsample of liquidators no differences occur 
between the exogenous and endogenous relationship. 27 
audit report is the logit estimate of the reduced form equation (3). We refer to table 2 
"  for the estimation of the  AR t variable for the total sample and subsamples of 
bankrupt  and liquidating firms. For subsample of mergers the business termination 
model only contains exogenous variables and hence the AR variable represents the 
actual audit report type that has been issued. When an unqualified opinion is issued 
AR takes the value zero, whereas it takes the value one in case of a non-clean audit 
report. 
"  For the total sample we found a significant result for the AR t variable, which 
confirms hypothesis 4. As for the audit report model, the probability of business 
termination is also estimated for the alternative subsamples. 
Regression on BUST for the subsample of bankrupt firms and their match (N I) 
"  yields a strong significant result for  AR t,(p=O.0003). This evidence is strongly 
supportive of the self-fulfilling prophecy that reception of a non-clean audit report 
triggers subsequent bankruptcy in Belgium and confirms the results found in 
previous studies (Hopwood et al.,  1989). For the subsample of liquidating firms (Nz) 
the AR t variable is not a significant determinant of the probability of liquidation 
(p=O.7256), meaning that the self-fulfilling prophecy does not hold for this category 
of business termination and thus that liquidations are not triggered by a non- clean 
audit opinion. This makes sense as voluntary liquidation is within the power of 
owners. In our opinion, this result provides an interesting contribution to the 
literature as in previous studies (Hopwood at aI.,  1989 ; citron & taffler,  1992) the 
self-fulling prophecy is only tested for a sample of bankrupt firms. FINALLY, 
estimation of the exogenous BUST model for the subsample of firms that merged or 
were taken over and their match yielded no significant results (p=O.390 1). This means that there is no evidence of the self-fulfilling prophecy for mergers. The 
results for the alternative subsamples confirm hypothesis 5. 
Investigation of the significance of the control variables in the BUST-model 
reveals differences across mergers, liquidators and bankrupt firms. 
28 
Financial variables, which measure a firm's liquidity status, i.e. EXPDEBT and 
NET CASH, are only significant when estimating the probability of bankruptcy. As in 
prior research on bankruptcy prediction in Belgium (See  also Ooghe and Verbaere, 
1982, and Ooghe et aI.,  1991), firms fail to pay privileged debtholders when financial 
problems  are  severe  (p=O.0619).  The  significance  of  the  NETCASH  variable 
(p=O.0956)  shows that bankrupt firms  use more bank debt to  finance  their daily 
activities, which certainly increases financial risk. The variable liq is not Significant 
(p=O.3925) for the sample of bankrupt firms.  Note that the above liquidity variables 
are not significant for the other two sub  samples  nor for the total sample. 
The results show that the financial variables that significantly affect liquidation are 
different than those that affect bankruptcy. Solvency and profitability but not 
liquidity affect the likelihood of  voluntary liquidation.  As expected, firms with a 
better return on equity (p=O.0429) and larger retained earnings (p=O.0795) have a 
larger chance to survive than to liquidate. A closer look at both measures shows that 
the composition of debt and profits also provides relevant information. If the daily 
activities of the firm are profitable (p=O.0053) and the share of short term debt 
decreases (p=O.077). the larger the chance of survival. These variables are however 
not significant for the other subsamples or the total sample. These results show that 
liquidity problems is the dominant factor for bankruptcy while profitability and 29 
solvency without liquidity problems are responsible for liquidation.  finally, mergers 
do not differ from survivers 14. 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
The Belgian capital market and audit environment differs significantly from 
the US. Notable differences are that the vast majority of firms is closely held, the 
audit of the financial statements is mandatory for many non-listed firms, and that 
the audit environment is virtually non-litigious. Given this different institutional 
environment, it  is investigated whether similar financial characteristics as in the US 
influence the auditor's reporting decision and whether the audit report has an 
economic role and information value for the various stakeholders of the finn. The 
information value of the audit report is not only studied for the failure but also for 
liquidation and merger. 
The study provides a contribution to the literature as the above two 
relationships are investigated by use of a simultaneous equations approach. The 
results indeed show that an endogenous relationship exists between  audit report 
type and  failure or voluntary liquidation, but not between audit report type and 
merger or take over. A possible explanation is that mergers are done for reasons 
other than weak financial performance. 
Given this endogenous relationship, the likelihood of business termination 
(liquidation or failure) is the main determinant of the audit report type. These results 
indicate that the financial determinants of audit report choice are similar to those in 
litigious environments and for listed firms. Another interesting result is that the 
quality of the internal control system as assessed and reported by the auditor 
14  When the results of the exogenous model are compared to those of the endogenised model, only the variable 
Oprofits (p=O.0033) becomes also significant in the exogenous model. The same holds for the sample of bankrupt 
firms (p=O.0766). For the subsample of liquidating firms, the variables, which measure the solvency position, 
become insignificant in an exogenous relationship. Finally, no differences occur for the group of mergers. influences the audit report decision only in case of less severe financial difficulties, 
that is for our subsample of merging firms and their match. 
30 
Finally, evidence is also provided that reporting differences exist between Big 
Six and non-Big Six firms in Belgium, but only in those cases where the fmancial 
difficulties are not that obvious, namely for liquidating firms. When a firm's financial 
problems are more straight forward, and subsequent failure is highly probable, no 
evidence of audit reporting differences between Big Six and non Big Six firms is 
found. 
Some interesting results are also found with respect to the self-fulfilling 
prophecy. We find evidence supportive of the self-fulfilling prophecy of failure, but 
not of liquidation and merger/take over. This implies that a non-clean audit opinion 
accelerates business termination when stakeholders other than the owners (such as 
banks and suppliers) have power to initiate business termination, that is in case of 
bankruptcy (failure). On the contrary, when owners have decision power on the 
timing of business termination, as is the case with a merger and voluntary 
liquidation, a non-clean audit report has no impact. 
In our opinion it would be worth wile to replicate various aspects of our study 
on American data, consisting of publicly held firms with diffuse ownership which are 
operating in a litigious environment. Questions which could be raised are: 1. 
whether reporting differences between Big Six and non Big Six firms can also be 
observed for subsamples of bankrupt firms versus liquidating firms; 2. Whether the 
self-fulfilling prophecy holds when a simultaneous models is adopted, and whether 
different results as to this prophecy can be observed between bankruptcy, 
liquidation and merger, as found in this study. REFERENCES 
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Table 1: Sample Description 
Panel A:  Audit Report Type and Business Survival Status 
Business Survival Status: 
Audit Report Type:  Survivors  Failure  Liquidation  Merger  /Take Over  Total 
Unqualified Opinion  195  [58,21%]  11  [3,28%]  41  [12,24%]  88  [26,27%]  335 
(88,64%)  (21,15%)  (66,13%)  (83,02%) 
All business terminations:  140  [41,79%] 
(63,64%) 
Qualified and  25  [23,81%  41  [39,05%]  21  [20,00%]  18  [17,14%]  105 
Adverse Opinion  (11,36%)  (78,85%)  (33,87%)  (16,98%) 
All business terminations:  80  [76,19%] 
(36,36%) 
Total  220  52  62  106  440 
All business terminations:  220 
Chi-square (p-value) =  111,6 (0,00l) 
Note: Numbers within parentheses are colu'mn percentages, Numbers within brackets are row percentages Panel B:  Financial characteristics of the firms  (means and standard deviation) 
Survivors  Failure  Liquidation  Merger/Take Over 
mean  stdev mean  stdev mean  stdv  mean  stdv 
Lnasset  5,034  0,7803  5,2567  0,4616  4,9476  0,889  5,0084  0,8362 
Existence of  0,7091  0,455  0,25  0,4372  0,3871  0,491  0,6792  0,469 
operating profits 
Expdebt  0,059  0,236  0,3654  0,4862  0,0484  0,2163  0,0472  0,213 
STBF  0,3045  0,461  0,8653  0,3446  0,3548  0,4823  0,2358  0,4265 
Liq  0,117  0,178  0,0583  0,0528  0,1228  0,233  0,1505  0,244 
Dalarm  15,59  114,2  1,2316  18,31  2,4063  12,078  8,3171  27,486 
lnasset=naturallogarithm of the total assets 
existence of operating profits= a durrnny, which equals 1 when the operating profits are positive 
expdebt= a durrnny, which equals 1 when the firm has expired debt to privileged stakeholders (employees, tax authorities), zero 
otherwise; 
STBF=a durrnny, which equals 1 when (cash +short term investments in financial assets-short term bank financing)<O; zero 
otherwise; 
liq= cash/current assets; 
Dalarm= net worth/(l/2 capital). 
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TABLE 2: HAUSMAN SPECIFICATION TEST 
THE AUDIT OPINION MODEL 
Step J: ReducedJorm estimation oj  Art 
AR,: Logit estimates oj  eq. 3 
Variables  Total Sample  Bankruptcies  Liquidations  Mergers/TO 
All Firms  And match  and match  and match 
N = 440  NJ  = 104  N2 = 124  N3 = 212 
COEFFICIENT  SIGNIFICANCE  COEFFICIENT  SIGNIFICANCE  COEFFICIENT  SIGNIFICANCE  COEFFICIENT  SIGNIFICANCE 
INTERCEPT  -2,8037  0.0324  -3,2419  0.4579  -4,8375  0.1070  -0,7451  0.7822 
BIGSLX  -0,3281  0.2722  -1,6884  0.0342  0,226  0.7526  0,1405  0.8165 
LNASSETS  0,4205  0.0493  0,9599  0.2140  0,1996  0.6472  -0,2479  0.5761 
IC  0,8716  0.0216  1,4106  0.0638  -2,0727  0.2541  3,3435  0.0002 
INVTA  0,6283  0.4576  -2,9371  0.0947  1,036  0.5427  6,2846  0.0006 
RECTA  1,3059  0.0143  1,5944  0.1903  -1,7103  0.2067  2,6407  0.0289 
STBF  0,6918  0.0438  2,1293  0.0165  0,5213  0.5452  0,0251  0.9735 
ALARM  -0,007  0.4260  0,0001  0.9697  -0,3154  0.0180  -0,021  0.4022 
ROE  -0,00269  0.0008  -0,00189  0.2347  -0,0063  0.0332  -0,00387  0.0016 
OPROFIT  0,0778  0.0002  2,2181  0.0027  0,1468  0.8383  -0,6448  0.2630 
EQFIN  -0,00887  0.0005  -0,000459  0.9672  -0,0137  0.0831  -0,00754  0.0576 
STDEBT  -1,4691  0.0015  -3,7931  0.0088  3,5279  0.0454  -3,0739  0.0024 
EXPDEBT  1,4227  0.0006  0,7183  0.3416  0,4263  0.8066  3,1691  0.0001 
NETCASH  -0,0047  0.9932  1,0453  0.5534  0,5811  0.6227  -1,3863  0.2483 
LIQ  0,7359  0.3024  10,9602  0.0667  -0,0606  0.9668  3,4256  O.OlGO 36 
Step 2: Results oj  estimation oj  eqs 7 
Total Sample  Bankruptcies  Liquidations  Mergers/TO 
All Finns  And match  and match  and match 
N = 440  N,  =  104  N2  =  124  N3  = 212 
COEFFICIENT  SIGNIFICANCE  COEFFICIENT  SIGNIFICANCE  COEFFICIENT  SIGNIFICANCE  COEFFICIENT  SIGNIFICANCE 
Intercept  -4.9633  0.0001  -4.7038  0.2569  -3.8238  0.0633  -1.0125  0.5292 
1\  +6.5951  0.0001  +3.9879  0.0008  +5.0035  0.0013  +3.5800  0.2002 
BUSTl+l 
1\  +1.0848  0.0001  +3.1864  0.0013  +1.8057  0.0270  +0.3809  0.4097 
v2 
BIGSIX  -0.2666  0.3373  -1.1648  0.1841  +2.0021  0.0166  -0.7709  0.2571 
LNASSETS  +0.0434  0.8070  +0.6327  0.4047  -0.0401  0.9126  -0.5055  0.0833 
IC  +0.4427  0.2359  +1.4347  0.0609  -1.9657  0.1580  +1.9038  0.0067 
INVrA  +1.7070  0.0376  -4.2558  0.0159  +1.0518  0.5626  +3.9725  0.0085 
RECTA  -0.2422  0.5826  +0.3021  0.7961  -1.2203  0.2118  -0.0743  0.9217 
STBF  +0.0454  0.8778  -0.5861  0.5631  +0.1634  0.8309  +0.4373  0.4068 
ALARM  -0.0137  0.1589  -0.00114  0.7848  -0.2836  0.0055  -0.0660  0.0830 
p-value of the  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001 
model 37 
THE BUSINESS TERMINATION MODEL 
BUST'+i : Logit estimates of  eq.  4 
Total Sample  Bankruptcies  Liquidations  Mergers/TO 
All Firms  and match  and match  and match 
N=440  NJ  = 104  N2 = 124  N3  = 212 
COEFFICIENT  SIGNIFICANCE  COEFFICIENT  SIGNIFICANCE  COEFFICIENT  SIGNIFICANCE  COEFFICIENT  SIGNIFICANCE 
INTERCEPT  -1,421  0.1370  -15.6706  0.0183  -1.9242  0.3047  -2.0207  0.1294 
BIGSlX  -0.0221  0.9188  -2.6008  0.0357  -1.3329  0.0103  0.8087  0.0085 
LNASSETS  0.2841  0.0639  2.732  0.0205  0.3034  0.3089  0.2593  0.2211 
IC  0.3148  0.3351  0,4124  0.6621  0.5438  0.4177  0.5836  0.3118 
INVfA  -0.8591  0.1924  -2.1156  0.2785  -0.1124  0.9360  -0.8458  0.4314 
RECTA  0.8984  0.0237  2.7726  0.0531  0.1613  0.8563  0.8098  0.1548 
STBF  0.5777  0.0314  5.759  0.0004  0.5157  0.3806  -0.1874  0.6473 
ALARM  -0.00161  0.4608  0.00048  0.8858  0.00031  0.9885  0.00242  0.6998 
ROE  0.00007  0.5361  0.00019  0.6872  -0.00695  0.0595  -0.000518  0.5456 
OPROFIT  -0.9234  0.0001  -4.1184  0.0007  -1.2826  0.0051  0.0285  0.9325 
EQFIN  -0.00193  0.3296  -0.00838  0.4884  -0.00901  0.0729  -0.000514  0.5609 
STDEBT  -0.118  0.7589  -2.0997  0.1069  1.6982  0.0723  -0.1954  0.7229 
EXPDEBT  0.6327  0.0971  3,4441  0.0074  -0.1093  0.9155  -0.5267  0.3832 
NETCASH  0,4563  0.2785  2.0277  0.3794  -0.1074  0.8958  0.3899  0.5197 
LIQ  0,4802  0.3785  19.8349  0.0570  -1.0885  0.3204  1.3408  0.0792 38 
Step 2: ResulL<; oj  estimation oj  eqs 8 
Total Sample  Bankruptcies  Liquidations  Mergers/TO 
All  Firms  and match  and match  and match 
N =  440  NI  = 104  N2 = 124  N3  = 212 
Intercept  -0.9331  0.0857  -5.3127  0.0272  -0.00900  0.9944  -0.2659  0.6282 
/\  +3.0128  0.0003  +7.3308  0.0005  +1.2046  0.3620  +0.6563  0.4321 
ARt 
/\  +1.0550  0.0003  2.9592  0.0008  +1.5246  0.0225  0.2665  0.6107 
vi 
ROE  +0.00021  0.5455  +0.00148  0.4816  -0.0081]  0.0517  0.0001  0.9180 
OPROF]T  -0.2876  0.2728  -0.1343  0.8945  -1.1219  0.0084  0.1065  0.7419 
EQFIN  -0.000032  0.9500  -0.00669  0.5422  -0.00364  0.4752  -0.000436  0.5870 
STDEBT  +0.5097  0.2101  +2.2129  0.2336  1.1333  0.1861  0.00174  0.9972 
EXPDEBT  -0.1696  0.7106  2.8090  0.0247  +0.3649  0.7207  -0.7962  0.2304 
NETCASH  +0.2909  0.4129  -3.3259  0.0559  -0.6542  0.2816  +0.5729  0.2263 
LIQ  0.0769  0.8783  -6.5547  0.2967  -0.8857  0.3059  +0.6381  0.3535 
p-value  0.0001  0.0001  0.0002  0.7533 TABLE 3: SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION LOGIT ESTIMATES OF THE AUDIT REpORT MODEL 
Panel A:  Results of endogenised audit report type model based on total sample (N) 
Variable 























*** Significant at the 1  % level;  ** Significant at the 5% level; 
* Significant at the 10% level 
p=value 
-21og intercept only 

















The Dependent variable, AR, takes the value 1 if the auditee received a qualified 
or adverse opinion and 0 if it received an unqualified opinion. 
Panel B:  Results of endogenised audit report type model for sample of bankrupt 
firms 
and match of survivors (Nll 
Variable  Parameter Estimate  p-value 
Dependent variable: AR 
INTERCEPT  -4,1839  0,249 
1\  3,6607  0,0003 *** 
BUSTt+! 
BSIX  -0,8659  0,2626 
LNASSET  0,5391  0,4226 
IC  1,1436  0,1055* 
INVTA  -3,3576  0,0354 *** 
RECTA  0,2905  0,7795 
STBF  -0,000993  0,7622 
ALARM  -0,4637  0,5716 
N-non clean  47 
N-total  104 
p=value  =0.0001 
-2log intercept only  143.212 
-2log intercept and  90.767 
covariates 
R2 
39 Panel C:  Results of endogenised audit report tvpe model for sample of liquidated 
firms 
and match of survivors (N2) 
Variable 












-2log intercept only 





























Panel D:  Results of 'exogenous' audit report tvpe model for sample of firms that 
merged ttaken over and match of survivors (N3) 
Variable 











-2log intercept only 





























40 TABLE 4: SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION LOGIT ESTIMATES OF THE BUSINESS TERMINATION MODEL 
Panel A:  Results of endogenised business termination model based on total 
sample (N) 
VariabLe  Parameter Estimate 
































••• Significant at the 1  % level; .* Significant at the 5% level; 
• Significant at the 10% level 
The Dependent Variable, BUST, takes the value 1 if  the firm terminated 
operations 
and 0 if it continued to exists 
220 
440 
Panel B:  Results of endogenised business termination model for sample of bankrupt firms 
and match of survivors (NIl 
VariabLe  Parameter Estimate 


































41 Panel C:  Results of endogenised business termination model for sample of liquidated firms 
and match of survivors (N2) 
Variable  Parameter Estimate 


































Panel D:  Results of 'exogenous' bUSiness termination model for sample of firms 
that merged/taken over and match of survivors (N3) 
Variable  Parameter Estimate 
Dependent variable: BUST 
INTERCEPT 
AR 
ROE 
OPROFIT 
EQFIN 
STDEBT 
EXPDEBT 
NETCASH 
LIQ 
-0.1889 
0.3785 
-0.000051 
0.0833 
-0.000493 
-0.0343 
-0.695 
0.5337 
0.6746 
N-Mergers/Take overs 
N-total 
p-value 
0.7125 
0.3901 
0.9525 
0.7932 
0.5617 
0.9444 
0.2548 
0.2485 
0.3222 
106 
212 
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